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Multiplicative weights, equalizers, and P=PPAD
Ioannis Avramopoulos
We show that, by using multiplicative weights in a game-theoretic thought experiment (and an
important convexity result on the composition of multiplicative weights with the relative entropy
function), a symmetric bimatrix game (that is, a bimatrix matrix wherein the payoff matrix of
each player is the transpose of the payoff matrix of the other) either has an interior symmetric
equilibrium or there is a pure strategy that is weakly dominated by some mixed strategy. Weakly
dominated pure strategies can be detected and eliminated in polynomial time by solving a linear
program. Furthermore, interior symmetric equilibria are a special case of a more general notion,
namely, that of an “equalizer,” which can also be computed efficiently in polynomial time by
solving a linear program. An elegant “symmetrization method” of bimatrix games [Jurg et al.,
1992] and the well-known PPAD-completeness results on equilibrium computation in bimatrix
games [Daskalakis et al., 2009, Chen et al., 2009] imply then the compelling P = PPAD.
1 Introduction
This paper is an intellectual exercise using multiplicative weights. There are many variants and
our results are perhaps not strongly bound to any particular multiplicative weights algorithm, but
our favorite is Hedge [Freund and Schapire, 1997, 1999], which we use as a friendly companion to
indulge in our intellectual pursuit. Our motivation is to compute Nash equilibria in polynomial
time, noting up front that we do not necessarily use Hedge to compute them—for example, we can
show as a simple implication of stronger properties that Hedge diverges from the equilibrium of
rock-paper-scissors—but we use Hedge to prove some very nice equilibrium properties as well some
properties on the structure of strategic games. The fact that Hedge does not necessarily converge is
not necessarily bad—we believe it can be used as a powerful model of “evolutionary behavior” (in
the sense of dynamical systems as well as that of biology) to explore “terrains” whether physical
or conceptual. This paper actually amounts to some notion of proof of such a claim.
1.1 Our main result
Our main result is to refute much of the folk wisdom on algorithmic game theory (and perhaps
complexity theory in general for that matter) showing P = PPAD.
1.2 Our detailed questions
There are many ways to understand the mathematics of this paper, but one of the most fruitful is as
a thought experiment: Can multiplicative weights serve as game theory’s foundation? The dominant
approach to understanding game theory is by means of the best response, the Nash equilibrium, and
how the two are related—the Nash equilibrium is a profile against which no player has an incentive
to deviate or, equivalently, it is a fixed point of the game’s best response correspondence. The
major problem with this approach is that alternating best responses may oscillate (or worse) and,
therefore, game theory’s “natural dynamic” does not correspond to an equilibrium computation
algorithm. Nevertheless, the concept of the best response dynamic is very helpful as it can be used
to prove that a Nash equilibrium always exists which is soothing in founding a theory of strategic
behavior based on the Nash equilibrium. So let us go back to our own question:
1.3 Our detailed results and techniques
Best response dynamics are very problematic because they are discontinuous (and, therefore, often
oscillatory or worse). One very prolific way of viewing multiplicative weights is as a continuous
approximation of best responses, a point which we support by a lemma: Multiplicative weights are
a continuous better response dynamic (for arbitrary values of the learning rate parameter). We do
not use this lemma in any of our results and we give it only as an illustration of this important
idea. Continuity and the better response property are important in a variety of ways not all of
which we explore here. However, our main result crucially relies on this continuity property along
with the continuity of the relative entropy function (known also as Kullback-Leibler divergence) and
the elementary result in analysis that the composition of continuous functions is continuous.
1.3.1 Our main overarching strategy
In contrast to the majority of contributions on equilibrium computation focusing on bimatrix games,
we focus instead on the more particular class of symmetric bimatrix games and even more specifically
with the computation of symmetric equilibria in this class of games (that is, equilibria wherein both
players use the same strategy). Symmetric equilibria in symmetric N -person (and, therefore, also
2-person) games are guaranteed to exist [Nash, 1951]. Symmetric equilibria are also a foundational
concept in evolutionary game theory [Maynard Smith and Price, 1973, Maynard Smith, 1982] but
we designate evolutionary aspects of equilibrium computation as out of scope of the present paper
simply to facilitate a more concise exposition of our results. Having laid out our overarching
strategy and approach, we should point out that our main techniques consist in two parts, namely,
in definitions and results on the properties of the concepts they define.
1.3.2 Our main definitions
An important idea in this paper is captured in the notion of an equalizer, an equilibrium notion
generalizing interior equilibria. This idea emerged as follows: Chen et al. [2009] point out that a
simple (inefficient) algorithm to find an equilibrium of a (general) bimatrix game is by support
enumeration and the solution of a corresponding linear (feasibility) program iteratively for each
support until an equilibrium is found. Of course the number of possible supports is exponential
and, therefore, this algorithm is inefficient in all games but those with a small number of pure
strategies. But there is an important detail in their formulation that can easily go unnoticed:
Given some support, the linear program Chen et al. [2009] formulate equalizes the pure strate-
gies in the support and restricts the pure strategies outside the support to yield payoffs that are
not superior to the payoffs pure strategies in the support yield. The important observation is that
the solution of this linear program can yield an equilibrium lying outside the given support wherein
the linear feasibility program is invoked (in that some pure strategies can receive zero probability).
The idea of an equalizer emerged in the effort to understand when this phenomenon occurs.
One very important “technical result” in this paper (which can be used to prove P = PPAD
as a simple exercise) is what happens to a symmetric bimatrix game if there is no equalizer.
One algorithmically interesting answer is that the absence of an equalizer implies the existence
of a weakly dominated pure strategy, which can be detected and eliminated in polynomial time
[Conitzer and Sandholm, 2005] without missing out on the overall equilibrium computation objec-
tive.
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1.3.3 Our main analytical techniques
Our proof of this property relies on a pair of lemmas on the behavior of a multiplicative weights
dynamic in the vector field of a symmetric bimatrix game which are results that emerged in our
effort to prove conditional convergent behavior (conditioned on the behavior of the payoff vector
field near an equilibrium). We designate the latter results out of scope to remain concise.
1.4 Related work
Our work and contributions in this paper were inspired by the success and beauty of online learning
theory, that is, machine learning theory though not in the (most popular) statistical framework but
instead in the regret minimization framework viewing nature as a nonstochastic opponent. We
apply online learning principles to the problem of Nash equilibrium computation.
1.4.1 Multiplicative weights
One of the earliest contributions in online learning is the “weighted majority algorithm” of Littlestone and Warmuth
[1994]. Freund and Schapire [1997] extend this algorithm to the problems of “online allocation” as
well as that of“boosting.” Arora et al. [2012] treat the history and applications of such algorithms
to learning, game theory, and optimization rather comprehensively.
Freund and Schapire [1999] prove convergence of a multiplicative weights algorithm to the value
of a zero-sum game—the algorithm is employed by one of the two player positions and the opponent
in the other position is assumed to be arbitrary. We note their result does not imply convergence to
the minimax equilibrium, but it furnishes an alternative proof of von Neumann’s minimax theorem.
Minimax equilibria in zero-sum games (such as the equilibrium of the rock-paper-scissors game)
may “repel” the multiplicative weights dynamic (but not always). This is easy to prove using
modified versions of analytical techniques employed in this paper (but the proof is omitted for
brevity). We note their proof techniques are based on the relative entropy as in this paper.
Similar negative results that multiplicative weights are not convergent to Nash equilibria are
obtained by [Daskalakis et al., 2010] and [Balkan et al., 2012]. We note that, as mentioned earlier,
we do not use multiplicative weights to compute Nash equilibria but rather as a mathematical tool
to “probe” (and characterize) the incentive (payoff) structure of strategic games.
1.4.2 Equilibrium computation and approximation
PPAD (Polynomial Parity Arguments on Directed graphs) is a complexity class introduced by
Papadimitriou [1994] to capture the difficulty of finding Brouwer fixed points. The archetypical
problem in this class is to find an unbalanced vertex in a directed graph given some other unbal-
anced vertex in the same graph. Such a vertex can always be found but the conjecture was that the
amount of time required to find one is exponential. Since PPAD was introduced, various problems
have been shown to be PPAD-complete such as that of computing an N -player Nash equilibrium
[Daskalakis et al., 2009] and that of computing a 2-player Nash equilibrium [Chen et al., 2009].
Adding support to the conjecture that PPAD captures hard problems, the Lemke-Howson algo-
rithm, generally regarded as the most efficient algorithm for computing a 2-player Nash equilibrium,
was shown to run in exponential time in the worst case [Savani and von Stengel, 2004].
There are two important threads of results on equilibrium computation and approximation,
namely, the approximation of Nash equilibria in bimatrix games and the approximation of KKT
(Karush, Kuhn, and Tucker) points in quadratic programs:
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(1)With respect to the first thread of results, under the assumption that PPAD 6= P the most sig-
nificant open question concerned the existence of a polynomial time approximation scheme (PTAS)
for equilibrium computation in bimatrix games (as it was well-known [Chen et al., 2009] that a full
polynomial time approximation scheme (FPTAS) would imply P = PPAD, which was considered
unlikely). There are two notions of approximation, namely, additive approximations and multi-
plicative ones. The first quasi-polynomial algorithm for additively approximate Nash equilibria in
bimatrix games is due to Lipton et al. [2003] based on the principle of looking for equilibria of
small support. There is a rich literature on the additively and multiplicatively approximations of
Nash equilibria. An interesting alternative approach, however, is to find an exact Nash equilibrium
with high probability. Ba´ra´ny et al. [2005] present an algorithm for finding a Nash equilibrium in
random 2-player games that runs in polynomial time with high probability. This algorithm is based
on searching for equilibria of small support. We note that the general methods employed in this
thread of research depart significantly from our algorithmic and proof techniques:
The algorithm we present in this paper instead looks for equilibria of (possibly) large support
(as equalizers are typically, but not always so, interior equilibria) and iteratively reduces the size
of the game (by iterated elimination of weakly dominated pure strategies), checking for an equal-
izer in each step, until a single pure strategy remains (implying the game is dominance solvable).
Alternatively, one may iteratively reduce the size of the basis game by iterated elimination until
no further reduction is possible in which case our results imply the existence of an equalizer. As
noted earlier, in contrast to other previous equilibrium computation efforts, our algorithm focuses
on symmetric bimatrix games trying to find an equilibrium that is symmetric. (Given a bimatrix
game an “equivalent” symmetric bimatrix game can be obtained by the Gale, Kuhn, and Tucker
symmetrization method [Jurg et al., 1992].) We have not verified if the absence of an equalizer in
general bimatrix games implies the existence of a weakly dominated pure strategy.
(2) With respect to the second thread of results symmetric equilibria in doubly symmetric bimatrix
games (that is, symmetric bimatrix games wherein the payoff matrix is symmetric) are known to
coincide with KKT points of a quadratic optimization problem whose objective function is X ·SX,
where S is the symmetric payoff matrix and X is a mixed strategy, and whose constraint set is a
standard (probability) simplex corresponding to the space of mixed strategies. The computation of
KKT points in (general) quadratic programs is known to admit an FPTAS [Ye, 1998]. Our results
in this paper imply a polynomial-time algorithm for computing KKT points of quadratic programs
over the probability simplex. We believe that our results can be extended to general quadratic
programs (over general polytopes) but we have not verified the conjecture.
1.5 Overview of the rest of the paper
Section 2 discusses preliminaries on bimatrix games and Nash equilibria. Section 3 gives our
equilibrium computation algorithm. We subsequently move on to prove its correctness starting
with a preliminary technical result on the structure of the best response correspondence in Section
4. Section 5 is concerned with the definition and properties of “multiplicative weights dynamics”
where some powerful technical lemmas important in the main result of this paper are stated and
proven. Section 6 proves our main result concerning an elementary property of a symmetric bimatrix
game without an equalizer, which is used to furnish a simple proof that P = PPAD in the same
section. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
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2 Preliminaries on bimatrix games
2.1 Bimatrix games
A 2-player (bimatrix) game in normal form is specified by a pair of n×m matrices A and B, the
former corresponding to the row player and the latter to the column player. If B = AT , where
AT is the transpose of A, the game is called symmetric. A mixed strategy for the row player is
a probability vector P ∈ Rn and a mixed strategy for the column player is a probability vector
Q ∈ Rm. The payoff to the row player of P against Q is P · AQ and that to the column player is
P ·BQ. Let us denote the space of probability vectors for the row player by P and the corresponding
space for the column player by Q. A Nash equilibrium of a 2-player game (A,B) is a pair of mixed
strategies P ∗ and Q∗ such that all unilateral deviations from these strategies are not profitable,
that is, for all P ∈ P and Q ∈ Q, we simultaneously have that
P ∗ ·AQ∗ ≥ P ·AQ∗
P ∗ · BQ∗ ≥ P ∗ · BQ.
We denote the set of Nash equilibria of (A,B) by NE(A,B).
2.2 Symmetric bimatrix games
Let (C,CT ) be a symmetric bimatrix game. We call a Nash equilibrium (P ∗, Q∗) of (C,CT )
symmetric if P ∗ = Q∗. Let (X∗,X∗) be a symmetric equilibrium. Then we call X∗ a symmetric
equilibrium strategy of (C,CT ). A well-known result due to Nash is that every symmetric N -person
game, and, therefore, also every symmetric bimatrix game, has a symmetric equilibrium.
Given (C,CT ), we denote its set of pure strategies by K(C,CT ) = {1, . . . , n}. Pure strategies
are denoted either as i or as Ei, a probability vector whose mass is concentrated in position i.
We denote the probability simplex in Rn, where n is the number of pure strategies of (C,CT ),
by X(C,CT ). We often refer to X(C,CT ) either as the probability simplex of (C,CT ) or as the
evolution space of (C,CT ), and it corresponds to the space of mixed strategies. We denote the set
of Nash equilibria of (C,CT ) by NE(C,CT ) and the set of symmetric Nash equilibrium strategies
thereof by NE+(C,CT ). Let X ∈ X(C,CT ) and define
C(X)
.
= {i ∈ {1, . . . , n}|X(i) > 0} .
We call C(X) the carrier or support of strategy X ∈ X(C,CT ). We call X ∈ X(C,CT ) interior
if C(X) = {1, . . . , n}. We denote the relative interior of X(C,CT ) (that is, the set of all interior
strategies of X(C,CT )) by X˚(C,CT ) and its boundary X¯(C,CT ). The carrier game of a strategy
X ∈ X(C,CT ) is the symmetric subgame of (C,CT ) whose pure strategies correspond to C(X).
3 Equilibrium computation algorithm
Let us first give the algorithm we propose for finding a symmetric equilibrium in a symmetric
bimatrix game. We first need to declare some subroutines:
3.1 Equalizer equilibria (or equalizers)
The first subroutine we need checks if a symmetric bimatrix game has an “equalizer” and if so
computes one. The declaration of this subroutine is:
5
Equalizer(C)
The input is the payoff matrix C of a symmetric bimatrix game (C,CT ) and the output is either
NULL if there is no “equalizer” of (C,CT ) or otherwise the output is a mixed strategy of (C,CT )
corresponding to an “equalizer” of (C,CT ). But let us precisely define what the subroutine checks
for (or computes)—to that end we start with the definition of an “equalizer:”
Definition 1. X∗ ∈ X(C,CT ) is called an equalizer if
∀X ∈ X(C,CT ) : (X∗ −X) · CX∗ = 0.
We denote the set of equalizers of (C,CT ) by E(C,CT ).
Note that E(C,CT ) ⊆ NE+(C,CT ). Equalizers generalize interior symmetric equilibrium
strategies, as every such strategy is an equalizer, but there exist symmetric bimatrix games with a
non-interior equalizer (for example, if a column of C is constant, the corresponding pure strategy
of (C,CT ) is an equalizer of (C,CT )). Note that an equalizer can be computed in polynomial time
by solving the linear (feasibility) program (LP)
(CX)1 = · · · = (CX)n,
n∑
i=1
X(i) = 1, X ≥ 0,
which we may equivalently write as
CX = c1, 1TX = 1, X ≥ 0,
where 1 is a column vector of ones of appropriate dimension. We may write this problem as a
standard LP as follows: Let
A
.
=
[
C −1
1T 0
]
and Y
.
=
[
X
c
]
.
then
AY =
[
C −1
1T 0
] [
X
c
]
=
[
CX − c1
1TX
]
,
and the standard form of our LP, assuming C > 0, is[
CX − c1
1TX
]
=
[
0
1
]
,X ≥ 0, c ≥ 0
where 0 is a column vector of zeros of appropriate dimension.
3.2 Strictly and weakly dominated strategies
The second subroutine we need checks if a pure strategy, say Ei, of a symmetric bimatrix game is
“weakly dominated.” The declaration of this subroutine is:
Weakly-dominated(i, C)
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This subroutine receives as a input a pure strategy i ∈ K(C,CT ) and returns as output either
True if the pure strategy is “weakly dominated” by some mixed strategy and False otherwise.
But let us precisely define the (well-known in game theory) notion of dominance and see how this
subroutine can run in polynomial time (with the complexity of linear programming).
There are two versions of dominance the stronger of which is commonly referred to as “strict
dominance.” Let us give the precise definition:
Definition 2. We say that the pure strategy Ei of (C,C
T ) is strictly dominated if
∃X ∈ X(C,CT ) ∀Y ∈ X(C,CT ) : Ei · CY < X · CY.
It is well known that eliminating a strictly dominated strategy cannot eliminate equilibria. Our
primary concern though is with a weaker dominance notion which doesn’t have this property:
Definition 3. We say that the pure strategy Ei of (C,C
T ) is weakly dominated if
∃X ∈ X(C,CT ) ∀Y ∈ X(C,CT ) : Ei · CY ≤ X · CY
and
∃Y ∈ X(C,CT ) : Ei · CY < X · CY.
If Ei is not weakly dominated we say it is undominated.
Unlike strict elimination, eliminating weakly dominated strategies can eliminate equilibria, how-
ever, every equilibrium of the surviving subgame is also an equilibrium of the basis game. (Note also
that, in weak iterated elimination, the order of elimination matters in that the surviving equilibria
depend on the order by which strategies are eliminated. This matter is rather tangential to the
main subject and result of this paper although a careful treatment of the subject is certainly impor-
tant. Note that checking if a pure strategy is weakly dominated (by some mixed strategy) admits a
polynomial-time algorithm (with the complexity of linear programming) [Conitzer and Sandholm,
2005] (see also [Myerson, 1991] and for iterated dominance see also [Knuth et al., 1988]).
3.3 The equilibrium computation algorithm
We may now give the pseudocode for the equilibrium computation algorithm (as Algorithm 1)
computing a symmetric equilibrium (that is, a Nash equilibrium wherein both players use the same
strategy) in a symmetric bimatrix game—such an equilibrium is guaranteed to exist [Nash, 1951].
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Algorithm 1 Symmetric-2-player-Nash(C)
1: if Size(C) == 1 then
2: return 1
3: else
4: if (X∗ = Equalizer(C)) != NULL then
5: return X∗
6: else
7: i = 1
8: while Weakly-dominated(i, C) == False do
9: i++
10: end while
11: Y ∗ = Symmetric-2-player-Nash(C/{Ei})
12: return Zero-Pad(Y ∗)
13: end if
14: end if
Notice the structure of the code is recursive: The algorithm receives as input the payoff matrix
C of a symmetric bimatrix game (C,CT ) and returns as output a symmetric equilibrium strategy
of (C,CT ). Let us briefly go through the pseudocode: If there is only one pure strategy (Line 1),
1 is returned as the solution, that is, a probability vector of one entry (Line 2). If the number of
pure strategies is greater than one, the algorithm first checks (in Line 4) if (C,CT ) has an equalizer
(an operation that can be performed by solving an LP as noted earlier). If there is an equalizer,
the routine terminates with the equalizer as the output (Line 5). Otherwise the algorithm itera-
tively looks for a weakly dominated pure strategy (Lines 7 to 10) and recursive calls itself on the
symmetric subgame that is obtained by removing the pure strategy from the set of pure strategies
(Line 11). Padding with zeros (Line 12) ensures consistency of the recursive calls. Note there are
other related variants of this specific (pseudocode) implementation that also work.
We may now proceed to prove the previous algorithm’s correctness. We start off by giving some
elementary and well-known definitions and propositions on “best responses” for completeness:
4 Best responses
In this section, we give basic background on best responses. Propositions 1, 2, and 3 are standard.
Definition 4. Let (A,B) be a bimatrix game and P×Q be the space of strategy profiles of (A,B).
Let Q ∈ Q be an arbitrary column-player strategy. We say P ∗(Q) ∈ P is a best response to Q if
P ∗(Q) ∈ argmax {P ·AQ|P ∈ P} .
Best responses of the column player against row-player strategies are defined similarly.
We have the following characterization of Nash equilibria in bimatrix games.
Proposition 1. (X∗, Y ∗) ∈ P ×Q is a Nash equilibrium of (A,B) if and only if X∗ ∈ P is a best
response to Y ∗ ∈ Q and, similarly, Y ∗ is a best response to X∗.
Proof. Straightforward from the definition of a Nash equilibrium.
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An important elementary property of best responses is given by the (aforementioned) best
response condition [von Stengel, 2007]:
Proposition 2. Given (A,B) let A and B be m×n matrices, P×Q be the space of mixed strategy
profiles of (A,B), X ∈ P, and Y ∈ Q. Then X is a best response to Y if and only if
∀i = {1, . . . ,m} :
[
X(i) > 0⇒ (AY )i = (AY )max ≡
m
max
i=1
(AY )i
]
.
The best response condition implies the following proposition.
Proposition 3. (X∗, Y ∗) ∈ NE(A,B) if and only if we simultaneously have:
(i) for all pure strategies Ei ∈ P such that i ∈ C(X
∗), Ei is a best response to Y
∗ and
(ii) for all pure strategies Ej ∈ Q such that j ∈ C(Y
∗), Ej is a best response to X
∗,
where P×Q is the space of mixed strategies of (A,B).
5 Multiplicative weights: Properties and lemmas
The next step in the algorithm’s correctness proof is a set of lemmas on “multiplicative weights
dynamics.” The specific dynamic we use to “probe” the mathematical structure and properties of
symmetric bimatrix games is based on Hedge [Freund and Schapire, 1997, 1999]. In this setting,
Hedge induces the following dynamic:
Ti(X) = X(i) ·
exp {αEi · CX}∑n
j=1X(j) exp {αEj · CX}
, i = 1, . . . , n. (1)
In this section, we give some properties of (1). We first show that X(C,CT ) is invariant under
T in that T never escapes the space of mixed strategies of the game (C,CT ) in which it is invoked.
Actually we also show that if T is started in the relative interior of X(C,CT ), T cannot escape
X˚(C,CT ) in a finite number of steps. Then we characterize fixed points and prove some powerful
lemmas. We also prove the promised “better response property” as Lemma 8 below.
5.1 Invariance
Note that, in general, α (typically referred to as the learning rate) may depend on X—we make
this explicit in somes lemmas for clarity.
Lemma 1. We have
∀α(X) ≥ 0 : X ∈ X(C,CT )⇒ T (X) ∈ X(C,CT )
and
∀α(X) ≥ 0 : X ∈ X˚(C,CT )⇒ T (X) ∈ X˚(C,CT ),
where T is as in (1).
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Proof. We have that, given any X ∈ X(C,CT ),
∀α(X) ≥ 0 :
n∑
i=1
Ti(X) =

 n∑
j=1
X(j) exp {α(X)Ej · CX}


−1
·
n∑
i=1
X(i) exp {α(X)Ei · CX} = 1,
implying positive invariance of X(C,CT ). Furthermore,
∀α(X) ≥ 0 : X(i) > 0⇒ Ti(X) > 0,
further implying positive invariance of the relative interior X˚(C,CT ).
5.2 Fixed points of Hedge
One of game theory’s principles is that “equilibrium” is synonymous to Nash equilibrium, defined
as a fixed point of the best response correspondence. The first order principle of the multiplicative
weights approach to game theory is, not surprisingly, a fixed point of the multiplicative weights
dynamic. In this section, we show how the two concepts are related. We refer to Nash fixed points
as “equilibria” and to multiplicative weights fixed points as “fixed points” simply for reasons of
remaining backward compatible with the game-theoretic nomenclature.
Definition 5. We say X∗ ∈ X(C,CT ) is a fixed point of (C,CT ) if it is a fixed point of (1). That
is, if X∗ = T (X∗). We denote the set of fixed points of (C,CT ) by FX(C,CT ). Note that
∀i ∈ K(C,CT ) : Ei ∈ FX(C,C
T ).
We denote the non-pure fixed points of (C,CT ) by FX+(C,CT ).
We have the following characterization of fixed points.
Theorem 1. X ∈ FX(C,CT ) if and only if, X is a pure strategy or otherwise
∀i, j ∈ C(X) : (CX)i = (CX)j .
Proof. First we show sufficiency, that is, if for all i, j ∈ C(X), (CX)i = (CX)j , then T (X) = X:
Some of the coordinates of X are zero and some are positive. Clearly, the zero coordinates will not
become positive after applying the map. Now, notice that, for all i ∈ C(X), exp{α(X)(CX)i} =∑n
j=1X(j) exp{α(X)(CX)j}. Therefore, T (X) = X.
Now we show necessity, that is, ifX is a fixed point of Hedge, then for all i and for all i, j ∈ C(X),
(CX)i = (CX)j : Let Xˆ(i) = Ti(x). Because X is a fixed point, Xˆ(i) = X(i). Therefore,
Xˆ(i) = X(i)
X(i) exp {α(X)(CX)i}∑
j X(j) exp {α(X)(CX)j}
= X(i)
exp {α(X)(CX)i} =
∑
j
X(j) exp {α(X)(CX)j},
which implies
exp {α(X)((CX)i − (CX)j)} = 1,X(i) > 0,
and, thus,
(CX)i = (CX)j ,X(i) > 0.
This completes the proof.
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The previous theorem says that X∗ ∈ FX(C,CT ) if and only if X∗ is an equalizer of its carrier
game. This is a necessary condition for equilibrium but it is not sufficient:
Lemma 2. If X∗ ∈ X˚(C,CT ), X∗ ∈ FX(C,CT ) if and only if X∗ ∈ NE+(C,CT ).
Proof. The lemma is a straightforward implication of the aforementioned best response condition
and Theorem 1: Suppose the interior X∗ ∈ NE+(C,CT ) and recall the best response condition:
X is a best response to Y if and only if X(i) > 0 ⇒ (CY )i = (CY )max. But a symmetric Nash
equilibrium strategy is a best response to itself, therefore, X∗(i) > 0⇒ (CX∗)i = (CX
∗)max. Since
X∗ is interior, for all i ∈ K(C,CT ), X∗(i) > 0, therefore,
∀i, j ∈ C(X∗) : (CX∗)i = (CX
∗)j .
The characterization of fixed points in Theorem 1 completes the proof.
As a straightforward implication of the previous lemma we obtain:
Lemma 3. If X∗ ∈ FX(C,CT )/NE+(C,CT ), then X∗ ∈ X¯(C,CT ). That is, every non-equilibrium
fixed point is a boundary strategy.
Proof. If X∗ 6∈ X¯(C,CT ), then X∗ ∈ X˚(C,CT ).
Overall we obtain:
Corollary 1. NE+(C,CT ) ⊆ FX(C,CT ).
Proof. Every symmetric equilibrium strategy is an equalizer of the its corresponding carrier game
by Lemma 2.
The fundamental difference between fixed points and equilibria is that fixed points survive
“inversion” of incentives. We call this principle “the virtue of vice versa” and it is proven next:
Theorem 2. FX(C,CT ) = FX(−C,−CT ).
Proof. The theorem clearly holds for all pure fixed points. Furthermore, by Theorem 1, X∗ ∈
FX+(C,CT ) if and only if
∀X ∈ X(C∗, C∗T ) : (X∗ −X) · C∗X∗ = 0
where C∗ is X∗’s carrier game. This completes the proof.
We do not invoke the virtue of vice versa in this paper, but it is important to keep in mind.
5.3 Some lemmas
5.3.1 Preliminaries: Relative entropy (or Kullback-Leibler divergence)
Our analysis of multiplicative weights dynamics relies on the relative entropy function between
probability distributions (also called Kullback-Leibler divergence). The relative entropy between
the n× 1 probability vectors P > 0 (that is, for all i = 1, . . . , n, P (i) > 0) and Q > 0 is given by
RE(P,Q)
.
=
n∑
i=1
P (i) ln
P (i)
Q(i)
.
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However, this definition can be relaxed: The relative entropy between n× 1 probability vectors P
and Q such that, given P , for all Q ∈ {Q ∈ X|C(P ) ⊂ C(Q)}, is
RE(P,Q)
.
=
∑
i∈C(P )
P (i) ln
P (i)
Q(i)
.
We note the standard well-known properties of the relative entropy [Weibull, 1995, p.96] that (i)
RE(P,Q) ≥ 0, (ii) RE(P,Q) ≥ ‖P −Q‖2, where ‖·‖ is the Euclidean distance, (iii) RE(P,P ) = 0,
and (iv) RE(P,Q) = 0 iff P = Q. Note (i) follows from (ii) and (iv) follows from (ii) and (iii).
5.3.2 The convexity lemma
Lemma 4. Let T be as in (1). Then
∀X ∈ X˚(C,CT ) ∀Y ∈ X(C,CT ) : RE(Y, T (X)) is a convex function of α ≥ 0.
Furthermore, unless X ∈ FX(C,CT ), RE(Y, T (X)) is a strictly convex function of α > 0.
Proof. We have
d
dα
RE(Y, Xˆ) =
=
d
dα

 ∑
i∈C(Y )
Y (i) ln
(
Y (i)
Xˆ(i)
)

=
d
dα

 ∑
i∈C(Y )
Y (i) ln
(
Y (i) ·
∑n
j=1X(j) exp{α(CX)j}
X(i) exp{α(CX)i}
)
=
d
dα

 ∑
i∈C(Y )
Y (i) ln
(∑n
j=1X(j) exp{α(CX)j}
X(i) exp{α(CX)i}
)

=
∑
i∈C(Y )
Y (i)
d
dα
(
ln
(∑n
j=1X(j) exp{α(CX)j}
X(i) exp{α(CX)i}
))
.
Furthermore, using (·)′ as alternative notation (abbreviation) for d/dα(·),
d
dα
(
ln
(∑n
j=1X(j) exp{α(CX)j}
X(i) exp{α(CX)i}
))
=
X(i) exp{α(CX)i}∑n
j=1X(j) exp{α(CX)j}
(∑n
j=1X(j) exp{α(CX)j}
X(i) exp{α(CX)i}
)′
and (∑n
j=1X(j) exp{α(CX)j}
X(i) exp{α(CX)i}
)′
=
∑n
j=1X(j)(CX)j exp{α(CX)j}X(i) exp{α(CX)i}
(X(i) exp{α(CX)i})
2 −
−
X(i)(CX)i
∑n
j=1X(j) exp{α(CX)j} exp{α(CX)i}
(X(i) exp{α(CX)i})
2 =
=
∑n
j=1X(j)(CX)j exp{α(CX)j}}
X(i) exp{α(CX)i}
−
−
(CX)i
∑n
j=1X(j) exp{α(CX)j}}
X(i) exp{α(CX)i}
.
12
Therefore,
d
dα
RE(Y, Xˆ) =
∑n
j=1X(j)(CX)j exp{α(CX)j}∑n
j=1X(j) exp{α(CX)j}
− Y · CX. (2)
Furthermore,
d2
dα2
RE(Y, Xˆ) =
(∑n
j=1X(j)((CX)j)
2 exp{α(CX)j}
)(∑n
j=1X(j) exp{α(CX)j}
)
(∑n
j=1X(j) exp{α(CX)j}
)2 −
−
(∑n
j=1X(j)((CX)j) exp{α(CX)j}
)2
(∑n
j=1X(j) exp{α(CX)j}
)2 .
Jensen’s inequality implies that∑n
j=1X(j)((CX)j)
2 exp{α(CX)j}∑n
j=1X(j) exp{α(CX)j}
≥
(∑n
j=1X(j)((CX)j) exp{α(CX)j}∑n
j=1X(j) exp{α(CX)j}
)2
,
which is equivalent to the numerator of the second derivative being nonnegative asX is a probability
vector. Note that the inequality is strict unless
∀i, j ∈ C(X) : (CX)i = (CX)j .
This completes the proof.
5.3.3 The stability lemmas
In the next lemma, we invoke the convexity lemma. We have:
Lemma 5. Let Y,X ∈ X(C,CT ) such that C(Y ) ⊂ C(X) and such that (Y −X) · CX > 0. Then
there exists α¯ > 0 (which may depend on Y and X) such that
∀α ∈ (0, α¯) : RE(Y, Xˆ) < RE(Y,X),
where Xˆ = T (X) and T is as in (1).
Proof. (2) implies that
d
dα
RE(Y, Xˆ)
∣∣∣∣
α=0
= (X − Y ) · CX < 0.
By the convexity RE(Y, Xˆ) as a function of α either
∀α > 0 : RE(Y, Xˆ) < RE(Y,X)
or
∃α¯ > 0 : RE(Y, Xˆ) = RE(Y,X)
implying
∀α ∈ (0, α¯) : RE(Y, Xˆ) < RE(Y,X)
as claimed.
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Under an additional assumption we can show an even stronger (important in our main result)
property:
Lemma 6. Let X be an interior strategy in the probability simplex of (C,CT ), assume X 6∈
NE+(C,CT ) and let
Y ∈ argmax{Y · CX|Y ∈ X(C,CT )}.
That is, Y is a best response to X. Then
∀α > 0 : RE(Y, Xˆ) < RE(Y,X),
where Xˆ = T (X) and T is as in (1).
Proof. If X ∈ NE+(C,CT ), ∀α ≥ 0 : RE(Y, Xˆ) = RE(Y,X) since ∀α ≥ 0 : Xˆ = X. Otherwise:
RE(Y, Xˆ)−RE(Y,X) =
∑
i∈C(Y )
Y (i) ln
(∑n
j=1X(j) exp{α(CX)j}
exp{α(CX)i}
)
(3)
= ln

 n∑
j=1
X(j) exp{α(CX)j}

− αY · CX (4)
= ln

 n∑
j=1
X(j) exp {α ((CX)j − Y · CX)}

 (5)
≤
n∑
j=1
X(j) exp {α ((CX)j − Y · CX)} − 1. (6)
(3) follows by plugging in the definition of relative entropy and straight algebra. (4) follows by
straightforward properties of the natural logarithm. (5) follows similarly. (6) follows from the
standard property of the natural logarithm that ln(y) ≤ y − 1, y > 0.
If
∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n} : (CX)j = Y · CX,
then X ∈ NE+(C,CT ) and, as noted earlier, in this case
∀α ≥ 0 : RE(Y, Xˆ) = RE(Y,X).
Assume, therefore, that
Y · CX =
n
max
j=1
(CX)j >
n
min
j=1
(CX)j ,
where the inequality on the left follows by the best response condition (Proposition 2). Then
∀α ≥ 0 : exp {α ((CX)j − Y · CX)} ≤ 1
and there exists j ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that
∀α > 0 : exp {α ((CX)j − Y · CX)} < 1.
Therefore,
∀α > 0 :
n∑
j=1
X(j) exp {α ((CX)j − Y · CX)} <
n∑
j=1
X(j) = 1.
This completes the proof.
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5.3.4 An instability lemma
The following lemma is crucial. We can prove it in two ways, one invoking the aforementioned
convexity lemma and the other by simply invoking Jensen’s inequality. We show both proofs:
Lemma 7. Let Y,X ∈ X(C,CT ) such that C(Y ) ⊆ C(X) and such that Y 6= X. If
max {(CX)i|i ∈ C(X)} > min{(CX)i|i ∈ C(X)} ,
then
X · CX − Y · CX ≥ 0⇒ ∀α > 0 : RE(Y, Xˆ)−RE(Y,X) > 0.
where Xˆ = T (X) and T is as in (1).
Proof. We have, by Jensen’s inequality, that
RE(Y, Xˆ)−RE(Y,X) =
∑
i∈C(Y )
Y (i) ln
Y (i)
Xˆ(i)
−
∑
i∈C(Y )
Y (i) ln
Y (i)
X(i)
= −
∑
i∈C(Y )
Y (i) ln Xˆ(i) +
∑
i∈C(Y )
Y (i) lnX(i)
=
∑
i∈C(Y )
Y (i) ln
X(i)
Xˆ(i)
=
∑
i∈C(Y )
Y (i) ln
(∑n
j=1X(j) exp{αEj · CX}
exp{αEi · CX}
)
= ln

 n∑
j=1
X(j) exp{αEj · CX}

− ∑
i∈C(Y )
Y (i) ln (exp{αEi · CX})
= ln

 n∑
j=1
X(j) exp{αEj · CX}

− α ∑
i∈C(Y )
Y (i)(Ei · CX)
≥ α
n∑
j=1
X(j)(Ej · CX)− α
∑
i∈C(Y )
Y (i)(Ei · CX)
= α(X · CX − Y · CX).
Therefore,
X · CX − Y · CX ≥ 0⇒ ∀α > 0 : RE(Y, Xˆ)−RE(Y,X) ≥ 0.
If maxi∈C(X){(CX)i} > mini∈C(X){(CX)i}, since Jensen’s inequality is strict,
X · CX − Y · CX ≥ 0⇒ ∀α > 0 : RE(Y, Xˆ)−RE(Y,X) > 0.
This completes the proof.
Second proof of Lemma 7. By the convexity lemma (Lemma 4), unless X ∈ FX(C,CT ), RE(Y, Xˆ)
is strictly convex. (2) implies that
d
dα
RE(Y, Xˆ)
∣∣∣∣
α=0
= (X − Y ) · CX ≥ 0.
Noting that RE(Y, Xˆ)
∣∣∣
α=0
= RE(Y,X) completes the proof.
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5.4 Better response property
Let us finally show our promised “better response property.”
Definition 6. We say that the map T : X(C,CT )→ X(C,CT ) is a better response dynamic if
∀X ∈ X : (Xˆ −X) · CX > 0,
where Xˆ = T (X), unless X is a fixed point of T .
The next lemma shows that T as defined in (1) is a better response dynamic.
Lemma 8. X ∈ X˚(C,CT ) implies Xˆ · CX ≡ T (X) · CX > X · CX unless X ∈ FX(C,CT ).
Proof. Suppose first that X 6∈ NE+(C,CT ), which implies (CX)max > (CX)min. Since the relative
entropy between Xˆ and X is positive:
RE(Xˆ,X) =
n∑
i=1
Xˆ(i) ln
(
Xˆ(i)
X(i)
)
=
n∑
i=1
Xˆ(i) ln
(
exp {α(X)Ei · CX}∑n
j=1X(j) exp {α(X)Ej · CX}
)
> 0.
Therefore,
ln

 n∑
j=1
X(j) exp {α(X)Ej · CX}

 < n∑
i=1
Xˆ(i) ln (exp {α(X)Ei · CX}) = α(X)Xˆ · CX. (7)
Furthermore, since ln(·) is concave, we obtain by Jensen’s inequality that
αX · CX < ln

 n∑
j=1
X(j) exp {α(X)Ej · CX}

 . (8)
(7) and (8) imply that
(Xˆ −X) · CX > 0
as desired. If X ∈ FX(C,CT ), Theorem 1 implies Xˆ = X.
6 Correctness proof of the equilibrium computation algorithm
In this section, we prove the correctness of Algorithm 1 and P = PPAD. We need the following
result on strategic dominance due to Pearce [1984] (see also [Weibull, 1995, p. 14]):
Proposition 4. The pure strategy Ei of (C,C
T ) is undominated if and only if
∃X ∈ X˚(C,CT ) : Ei is a best response to X.
We also need the following lemmas:
Lemma 9. Let Y ∈ X¯(C,CT ) and X ∈ X˚(C,CT ). If RE(Y, T (X)) is strictly convex, then exactly
one of the following hold:
(i) limα→∞ (RE(Y, T (X)) −RE(Y,X)) = +∞.
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(ii) limα→∞ (RE(Y, T (X)) −RE(Y,X)) < 0.
Furthermore, a necessary and sufficient condition for (ii) is that Y is a best response to X.
Proof. By the “convexity lemma” (Lemma 4), RE(Y, T (X)) is strictly convex if and only if X is
not a fixed point. So let us assume this is the case. There are now three possibilities:
First possibility: Assume (Y −X) · CX ≤ 0. Then the “instability lemma” (Lemma 7) implies
lim
α→∞
(RE(Y, T (X)) −RE(Y,X)) = +∞.
Second possibility: Assume (Y −X) · CX > 0 but Y is not a best response to X. Recall (5):
RE(Y, Xˆ)−RE(Y,X) = ln

 n∑
j=1
X(j) exp {α ((CX)j − Y · CX)}


and note that by the assumption that Y is not a best response to X there exists i such that
(CX)i > Y · CX implying that
lim
α→∞

 n∑
j=1
X(j) exp {α ((CX)j − Y · CX)}

 = +∞.
Therefore,
lim
α→∞
(RE(Y, T (X)) −RE(Y,X)) = +∞.
Third possibility: Assume Y is a best response to X (implying (Y −X) ·CX > 0). Then Lemma
6 implies that
lim
α→∞
(RE(Y, T (X)) −RE(Y,X)) < 0.
This completes the proof.
Lemma 10. Suppose X˚(C,CT ) ∩ FX(C,CT ) = ∅, let X ∈ X˚, and
Y ∈ argmax{Y · CX|Y ∈ X(C,CT )}.
That is, Y is a best response to X. Then
∀X ∈ X˚(C,CT ) : Y ∈ argmax{Y · CX|Y ∈ X(C,CT )}.
Proof. It is well-known that the best response correspondence is upper hemicontinuous. Finally,
upper hemicontinuity of the best response correspondence implies that the set of strategies against
which Y is a best response (that is, the lower inverse of Y under the best response correspondence)
is closed [Corbae et al., 2009, Theorem 6.1.23]. Suppose now Y is a best response to an interior
strategy and that the boundary of the set of strategies against which Y is a best response intersects
the interior X˚(C,CT ) of the probability simplex of (C,CT ). Let X lie on the boundary of the
intersection. Then there exists X ′ ∈ X˚(C,CT ) such that
∀ǫ ∈ (0, 1] : Y 6∈ argmax{Y · CX(ǫ)|Y ∈ X(C,CT )}
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where
X(ǫ) = (1− ǫ)X + ǫX ′.
That is, Y is best response against X but it is not a best response against any other X(ǫ). Since,
for all X ∈ X˚(C,CT ), X 6∈ FX(C,CT ), for all X ∈ X˚(C,CT ), RE(Y, T (X)) is strictly convex (by
the convexity lemma). Lemma 9 implies then that
lim
α→∞
(RE(Y, T (X)) −RE(Y,X)) < 0
and
∀ǫ ∈ (0, 1] : lim
α→∞
(RE(Y, T (X(ǫ))) −RE(Y,X(ǫ))) = +∞.
Since RE(Y, T (X(ǫ)))−RE(Y,X(ǫ)) is continuous, this is clearly impossible. Hence the lemma.
Lemma 11. Suppose X˚(C,CT ) ∩ FX(C,CT ) = ∅, let X ∈ X˚, and
Y ∈ argmax{Y · CX|Y ∈ X(C,CT )}.
That is, Y is a best response to X. Then
∀X ∈ X˚(C,CT ) : (Y −X) · CX > 0.
Proof. Since X 6∈ NE+(C,CT ), the best response condition (Proposition 2) implies that
Y ∈ argmax{Y · CX|Y ∈ X(C,CT )} ⇒ (Y −X) · CX > 0
and, then, Lemma 10 completes and proof.
Using the previous lemma we obtain the following theorem, which is a statement about the
incentive structure of a symmetric bimatrix game without an (interior) equalizer:
Theorem 3. X˚(C,CT )∩FX(C,CT ) = ∅ if and only if there exists a weakly dominated pure strategy
of (C,CT ).
Proof. By Proposition 4, the pure strategy Ei is undominated if and only if it is a best response to
some interior (completely mixed) strategy. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction that every pure
strategy is a best response to some interior strategy. Then Lemma 11 implies
∀i ∈ K(C,CT ) ∀X ∈ X˚(C,CT ) : (Ei −X) · CX > 0. (9)
We consider two possibilities:
First possibility: Assume first K(C,CT ) ≥ 3: Consider a pure strategy Ei, a pair of pure
strategies Ej1 6= Ej2 different from Ei, and let Y = (1 − ǫ)Ej1 + ǫEj2 , ǫ ∈ (0, 1), such that there
exists a convex combination of Ei and Y in X˚(C,C
T ). Then all such convex combinations are
interior. Furthermore (9) implies
∀X as convex combinations of Ei and Y : (Ei −X) · CX > 0 and (Y −X) · CX > 0,
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which is clearly an impossibility as (Ei −X) ·CX > 0 implies the angle between the payoff vector
CX and Ei−X is acute and (Y −X)·CX > 0 similarly. But Ei−X and Y −X point in exactly oppo-
site directions leading to a contradiction. Therefore, there exists a weakly dominated pure strategy.
Second possibility: If K(C,CT ) = 2, the argument is entirely analogous.
The reverse direction is straightforward from Propositions 3 and 4: If X˚(C,CT )∩FX(C,CT ) 6=
∅, every pure strategy is a best response to the interior symmetric equilibrium strategy by Proposi-
tion 3 (on best responses). Therefore, Proposition 4 implies every pure strategy is undominated.
Based on the previous results, we have:
6.1 Correctness proof of Algorithm 1
To prove the correctness of Algorithm 1 it suffices to prove that if E(C,CT ) = ∅ there exists a weakly
dominated pure strategy. But this is a simple implication of Theorem 3 and the straightforward
observation that
E(C,CT ) = ∅ ⇒ X˚(C,CT ) ∩ FX(C,CT ) = ∅.
Note the algorithm clearly runs in polynomial time.
6.2 P = PPAD
The problem of computing an equilibrium of a bimatrix game is PPAD-complete [Daskalakis et al.,
2009, Chen et al., 2009]. Furthermore equilibrium computation in a bimatrix game can be reduced
to the problem of equilibrium computation in a symmetric bimatrix game by the symmetrization
method of [Jurg et al., 1992]. Since Algorithm 1 always terminates with a symmetric equilibrium
of the symmetric game whose payoff matrix it receives as input, and since it is straightforward to
verify that its running time is polynomial, that P = PPAD follows immediately.
7 Concluding remarks
The computational complexity of our algorithm is good but it is certainly not “perfect” as it can
be improved by a significant factor. Improving this algorithm and extending our results to other
computational complexity classes is the main subject of our ongoing work on this topic.
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